Ethel Louise Gregerson v. Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company : Appellant\u27s Petition for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Ethel Louise Gregerson v. Equitable Life and
Casualty Insurance Company : Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley; Verl C. Ritchie; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Gregerson v. Equitable Life, No. 7674 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1479
Case No. 7674 
SEP 2 8 1953 
lAW UBii.~R1 
u. ~· u. 
IN THE SUPREME COUR.T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
A C.ORPORATION, 
D·efendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW, 
. . ~ V~RL ,C·. RITCHIE, 
F l,. If., . l t) •I i''· '·:I'·· .·J · : •. J\..J .CJ . Attorneys for Appellant. 
I Jll\~ 1.. 5 1~.53 
A.2k z .. , . 2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T_.:\_BLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Petition for Rehearing __________________________ -----------------~-------------·----------- 1 
Statement -------------- _______________________ ........ _. ___ .. __ ... __ ... ------------------"--------- 2 
Statement of Points -------------------------------------·---------------------------------- 1 
Argument: 
Point I. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE REQUIREMENT OF SOUND HEALTH WAS 
WAIVED AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE 
POLICY WHERE DEFENDANT HAD NO KNOWL-
EDGE OF FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED FACTS, 
AND WHERE THE FACTS NEGATIVE INTENT TO 
WAIVE THAT REQUIREMENT. ---------------------------------------- 6 
POINT II. THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE EF-
FECT OF BREACH OF WARRANTIES IN THE IN-
SURANCE APPLICATION AS SUCH BREACH RE-
LATES TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE POLICY AND 
THE WAIVER RIDER, WHICH WAS AN INTEGRAL 
PART OF THE SAME. --------------------· ·------------------------------------ 13 
Conclusion ------------ ________ -------------------- ____________ ---·-·--------··---------------. 17 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
16 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Sec. 9086____________________ 8 
16 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, Sec. 9085 ---------------- 8 
Re Auerbach Estate, 23 Utah 529·----------------------------------------------- 7 
Ballard vs. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 82 Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 847 .. 10 
Braddock, by Smith vs. Pacific Woodmen Life A~ssociation, 
89 Utah 75, 54 Pac. 2d 1189 ------------------------------------------------10, 15 
Bull vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 12 S.E. 2d 24, 
195 s. c. 536 ______ ------------------- --·------------- ------------------------------------- 9 
Eklund vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 89 Utah _273, 
57 p. 2d 362 -----. ---------.----------------------------------------------------- ---~ --- 10 
Jones vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 69 Utah 172, 
253 Pac. 200 __ . ___________________ -------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Kelly vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 38 A. 2d 
176, 131 Conn. 106 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
Phoenix Insurance Company vs. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 
Pac. 2d 308 -------- ·-------------------·-··-----·------------·---------------------------··· 7 
Planter's Mutual Ins. Co. v~s. Loyd, 67 Ark. 588, 56 S.W. 
45 --------------------------.--.----------- .. ---------------------------------- --·-- ------.-----9' 13 
Reed vs. Union Life Insurance Co., 21 Utah 295, 61 Pac. 21._____ 7 
White vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 63 Utah 272, 
224 Pac. 1106 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, } 
vs. ( 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
A CORPORATION, 
D·efenda;nt and Appellant. 
C-ase ~v. 7674 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND BRIEF IN STJPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellant, Equitable Life and Casualty Insur-
ance Company, a corporation, petitions the court for a 
rehearing and reargument of the above entitled case 
upon the following grounds: 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RE-
QUIREMENT OF SOUND HEALTH WAS WAIVED AT THE 
TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY WHERE DEFEND-
ANT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF FRAUDULENTLY CON-
CEALED FACTS, AND WHERE THE FACTS NEGATIVE 
INTENT TO WAIVE THAT REQUIREMENT. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE EFFECT OF 
BREACH OF WARRANTIES IN THE INSURANCE APPLI-
CATION AS SUCH BREACH RELATES TO THE EXISTENCE 
OF THE POLICY AND THE WAIVER RIDER, WHICH WAS 
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SAME. 
WHEREFOR.E, petitioner prays that the judgment 
and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument be 
permitted of the entire case. 
A 'brief in support of this Jletition is fHed here,vith. 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW, 
VERL (_2TCHIE, ~ 
By ----------------- - - --- -------- - ----------------------- ----
Attorneys for Appellant 
V erl C. Ritchie hereby certifies that he is one of the 
attorneys for appellant and petitioner herein and that, 
in his opinion, there is good cause to believe that the 
judgment and decision of the Court is erroneous and that 
the case should be reheard and reargued as prayed for in 
said petition. 
Dated June r8,-~53. -
---------- ___ v__ ----------------------------------------------------------- -----
STATEMENT 
Appellant fully appreciates the reluctance of this 
Court to entertain a 1\fotion for Rehearing. We are firmly 
convinced, however, that this decision, if permitted to 
stand, will not only in effect overturn a long and well 
established line of Utah authorities, but will tend to 
distur'b and even de·stroy settled rules of applicable in-
surance laws which have long been accepted and acted 
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upon by all insurance companies op·erating within the 
State of Utah. For this reason \Ye 1nust evidence a deep 
concern over the effect of the decision as 1nany contracts 
of insurance which are outstanding and procedural 
n1ethods of underwriting 'vill be seriously and adversely 
affected. 
rrhe opinion would seem to wholly disregard the 
effect of breach of warranties contained in a policy ap~ 
plication, where no medical examination is required. As 
a practical1natter, there are many instances where insur-
ance con1panies have been willing to issue such policies 
upon the assumption that they are protected in so doing 
against the deceit and misrepTesentation of the applicant. 
If the ability of insurance co1npanies to rely upon such 
representations and warranties is, in effect, destroyed, it 
\vill undoubtedly be necessary to require in each instance 
of policy issuance a detailed and far-reaching medical 
examination which is both costly and burdensome, and 
which will in ultimate effect react to the detriment of the 
public generally. 
The opinion states that the 'basic and decisive issue 
in this case is whether or not defendant herein waived 
the right to insist up·on compliance with the requirement 
of a showing by the insured of physical insurability be-
fore granting a pToper request for reinstatement. In 
considering such is.sue, however, the opinion basically 
is concerned with an interpretation of the policy terms, 
and the relation between what might be described as the 
base policy and the waiver rider aspects of the policy. 
The position of app·ellant, which we believe the· Court 
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has either misconstrued or overlooked, is that the effect 
of the breach of warranty is to destroy the policy from 
its beginning, and with it the basic premise upon which 
any waiver could he 'based, since that waiver was at-
tached to the policy at the time of issuance and an 
integral part of the same. In addition to this, the opinion 
seems to also overlook the fact that no waiver could 
possibly have been made without the intentional relin-
quishment of known rights, and to allow recovery where 
the very premise of waiver is destroyed, since the appel-
lant had no knowledge of the breach of warranties and 
misrepresentations of assured and was, therefore, wholly 
ignorant of its rights to refuse the issuance of the policy. 
We believe the issues in this case can be very simply 
stated as to whether an insured, who wilfully and know-
ingly conceals a seTious and farreaching illness so mateT-
ially increasing the risk that the policy never would have 
been issued had this condition been known, may be per-
mitted to.take advantage of his own conduct. 
There is no question as to the applicable facts, par-
ticularly with reference to breach of wararnty. On 
May 23, 1947, Dr. Grant Gregerson made a \vritten appli-
cation to the Mountain States Insurance Co1npany for 
a membership policy. This application, whose factual 
statements were warranties and not representations, con-
tained ce·rtain statements of the Doctor relative to his 
state of he~alth at the time. He stated. that he was in · 
good health and had suffered no prior serious illness and 
that he had· had no heart or circulatory disease. In fact, 
the evidence is clear that from April 27 to May 11, 1946, 
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the assured was hospitalized with a serious cardiac fail-
ure and hypertention and that these conditions existed 
at the time application was n1ade. 
Based up·on such application and the warranties con.., 
tained therein, the appellant issued a policy of insurance. 
This policy consisted not only of what might he termed 
a standard form, but, as integral parts, the application 
and a rider designated as a waiver. It is the position of 
the appellant that, in view of the undisp·uted breach of 
warranty on the part of the assured .and of the state-
ments in the application, that if there he misrepresenta-
tions or untrue statements therein, there is a complete 
forfeiture of any benefits, the appellant had the right to 
cancel the policy, including both the base p·olicy and the 
,Naiver rider. There is no other premise upon which can 
be based the action of the Comp~any in demanding· and 
receiving this application, and it becomes in reality a 
condition prece·dent to the effective existence of either 
the waiver or the base policy. 
For this reason we say that the net effect of this 
decision is to permit an assured to knowingly and falsely 
conceal a true state of health as to matters directly and 
materially affecting the risk and to permit a beneficiary 
thereafter to recover for death resulting from the very 
physical disability which had heen misrepresented and 
which constituted a breach of warranty. 
Our principal coneern lies in the fact that the Court, 
in its decision, literally ignores the question of warranty, 
and treats the application and its effectiveness as non-
existent, notwithstanding that that application was the 
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very premise upon which the policy was issued. For this 
reason we say that the Court has thereby directly attacked 
a long line of decisions of Utah courts relative to the 
effective force of a breaeh of warranty, and, by this 
decision, has created a state of confusion in regard to 
warranties in insurance law in the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RE-
QUIREMENT OF SOUND HEALTH WAS WAIVED AT THE 
TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY WHERE DEFEND-
ANT HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF FRAUDULENTLY CON-
CEALED FACTS, AND WHERE THE FACTS NEGATIVE 
INTENT TO WAIVE THAT REQUIREMENT. 
The net result of the decision is to hold that defend-
ant has waived all rights to rely on the defense of breach 
of warranty. rt is perfectly clear in the record that there 
was such a breach of warranty in concealing and failing 
to state a serious cardiac ailment, and that such Inis-
statement was material to the risk. 
The appellant had no knowledge of these fradulent 
state·ments contained in the ap·plication, nor does the 
respondent claim in any way that this knowledge was 
possessed by appellant.. We, therefore, submit that, in 
practical effect, there was no effective policy or waive-r, 
and that under the terms of the application the company 
has the right to decline any payments upon surrender of 
premiums which had been paid. 
If it be contended that the application was, in effect, 
destroyed by the waiver, which to us is an incredible con-
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tention, the fact still ren1a1ns that a wa1ver cannot 
be effectively made unless the party so waiving is ad-
vised of the underlying facts at the time of the waiver 
and of the existence of a right to forfeit the policy. 
That a 'vaiver is effective only when it is intention-
ally made and 'vith kno,vledge of the circumstances has 
been 'veil settled in l 1 tah for Inany years. Re: Auerbach 
Estate, 23 Utah 529; Reed v. Union Life Insurance, 21 
Utah 295, 61 Pac. 21; Phoenix Insurance Comparny v. 
Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 Pa.c. (2d) 308. 
Waiver is universally defined as "an intentional 
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right." See 
Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed. 
Since appellant was ignorant of the facts that in-
sured was actually in serious physical condition, it can-
not be said to have waived such condition at the time of 
issuance of the policy. In the case of Reed vs. U1iion Life 
Instttrance, supra, the court stated at page 309 of Vol. 21 
of the Utah Reports : 
"The question of the plaintiff's knowledege or 
ignorance in the matter is involved. If the plain-
tiff was ignorant of the fact that he was entitled 
to his commission at the time and after the de-
fendant purehased the surrender of the poliey·, 
and did not intentionally waive his right therein 
after full knowledge, he was entitled to recover. 
This is so because a waiver is an intentional re-
linquishment of a known right, and there must be 
both knowledge of the existence of the right and 
an intention to relinquish it. The waiver, if any, 
was a question of intent on the part of the plain-
tiff. Knowledge of the rights he had, and an 
intention to waive such rights should be made 
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such a case as this, he justified in declaring it." 
plainly to appear before a court or jury ·would, in 
The ne·ce1ssity of knowledge of breach in an insurance 
policy before the law of waiver can be invoked is well 
stated in Vol. 16, Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, 
Sec. 9086, page~ 616, as follorws: 
"It must ordinarily be shown, therefore, that 
the insurer had knowledge of the facts constitut-
ing a breach of forfeiture, and that there wa.1 
some unequivocal act of the insurer recognizing 
the continuance of the policy or which was wholly 
inconsistent with a forfeiture. Such knowledge 
must be shown if negotiations with the insured 
are made the basis of a waiver. * * * 
"* * * The insure~r's notice of kno,vledge of 
the falsity o.f an insured's representation in an 
application for a life policy must be as broad, 
comprehensive, and extensive as the representa-
tion and extended to s·o much thereof as is material 
in order to waive its right to forfeit the policy for 
such misrepresentation." 
Appleman, Sec. 9085, sets out restrictions on con-
struction of waivers as foHows: 
"In insurance law, to constitute a waiver~ 
there must he an actual intention to relinquish an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage, with know-
ledge, either actual or constructive, of its exist-
ence, or such conduct as to warrant an inference 
of such intention to relinquish." 
Inasmuch as a waiver is largely a question of intent, 
.an intention to waive the rights must appear, as well as 
a knowledge of the facts, before the Court is justi-
fied in declaring suC'h a 'va1ver. See Reed vs. Union 
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Life Insu.rance, supra.. The fact that an application in 
lieu of the physical exa1nina.tion by a physician was 
required 'before the application could be acted upon is 
entirely inconsistent 'vith the intent to "\Vaive this re-
quirement at the time of the issuance of the policy. When 
the terms of the application, as well as the p·rovisions in 
the policy are construed as a whole, it cannot be said 
that this requirement was waived. If the requirement 
was 1caived, why then, did app·ellant insist upon the 
completion of the application before the policy issued? 
The Court, in its decision app~arently fails to con-
sider the fact that a new and different type policy vva~ 
issued upon the life of Dr. Gregerson. That a prior 
policy had b-een in effect on assured's- life. is of no con-
sequence, although the Court app·arently was of the 
opinion that such fact was of some importance. In the 
case of Kelly vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
38 A. 2d 176, 131 Conn. 106, it was held that an insurer 
was not estopped from asserting that the assured was 
not in good health a:t the time the policy was issued as 
required, merely because the policy was issued upon the 
surrender of an _earlier policy, p·articularly where there 
was no fraud on the· p·art of the insurer. 
Indeed, the requirement of knowledge as an element 
. of waiver applies with much greater force when the 
insurer is ignorant of the forfeiture and the misstate-
ments which cause it. It is clear that there can be no 
-\vaiver irnplied under these circumstances. See Planter's 
Mutual Inc. Co. vs. Loyd:, 67 Ark. 588, 56 S.W. 45; Bull vs. 
Jf etropolitan Life Insurance Co., 12 S.E. 2d 24, 195 s.·c. 
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536; and Guenther vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., ~{o. 
App., 189 S.W. 2d 12. 
Nor can the doctrine of estoppel be· invoked against 
the defendant, when it was not aware of the misstate-
ments of assured. See Ballard vs. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 
82 Utah 1, 21 Pac. 2d 84 7, at page 26 of Vol. 83 Utah Re-
ports, wherein the Court quotes at length from "Glob .. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326, 333, 24 L. Ed. 
387. The language is particularly apropros in view of 
the Court's decision: 
"The holder of the policy cannot be permitted 
to conceal from the company an important fact, 
like that of the insured being in extremis, and then 
to claim a waiver of the forfeiture created by the 
act which brought the insured to tha;t condition. 
To permit such concealment, and yet to give to 
the action of the comparny the same effect as 
though no concealment were made, would tend to 
sanction a fraud on the part of the policyholder, 
instead of protecting him against the comntission 
of one by the company." (Italics ours) 
By its decision the Court condones the concealme:nt of 
important and material facts by assured, when a;bsolute 
good faith was required on his part. The. decision mini-
mizes the importance of the false statments of warranties 
in the application. Whether the policy would he issued 
was dependent on the ans-\vers to the statements, and the 
policy was issued on the assumption that the answers 
were true. S-ee Braddock, by Smith. vs. Pacific Woodmen 
Life Association, 89 Utah 75, 54 Pa.c. 2d 1189. 
The case of Eklund vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co., 89 Utah 273, 57 P. 2d 362, involves a suit on certain 
10 
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so-called •'ind11strial policies." 11he insuranet~ co1np~any 
contended, a1nong other things, that there was a breach 
of warranty in the applications and fraud in procuring 
the polieies. Under facts soine\Yhat sin1ilar to the presenc 
case, the Court held that the nlisstatements by the as-
sured rendered the policies void, stating at page 282, 
\ ... ol. S9 of the Utal1 Reports: 
··* * * In the applications for insurance, as 
heretofore set out, the assured stated that she 
had neYer been tmder treatn1ent in any hospital; 
that she had not been under the care of any phy-
sician within three years; she declared that these 
staten1ents \Yere true and complete and that any 
misrepresentation would render the policy void. 
rrhese statements wer·e false. Her application for 
the first policy was made November 2, 1933, less 
than a 1nonth after the last date she had been 
treated by Dr. Quick. The application for the 
second policy was made the 31st of January, 1934, 
two days after assured had been treated by Dr. 
Taufer at the Salt Lake General Hospital. The 
statements which the assured made were mater~ial 
to the risk. The policies were issued without an.y 
physical examina.tion of the assured. Whether 
the cornpany would ·issue the policies was depend-
ent upon the answers of the assured. The utmost 
good faith to answer truthfully was required of 
her. On the assumption tha.t the statements i.n 
the applications were tru-e, the policies 1Dere 
issued. By making the false representations, 
\Vhieh the assured did, the comp~any was misled 
to its prejudice. Whether we class the statements. 
u1ade 1by the assured as representations or war-
ranties, the same result is reached so far as the 
facts of this case are concerned. If a representa-
tion is material to the risk and likewise knowingly 
11 
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false, it will be as potent for a rescission of the 
contract embodied in the policy as if th.e untrue 
statement was made iu form a warranty." (Italics 
ours) 
The analogy between the Eklund case and the pre-
sent case shows the importance with which certain of 
the facts were treated in that case. It can only be con-
cluded that the court has overlooked such facts in reach 
ing its decision. 
· Respondent, in her original brief, lays considerable 
stress upon the fact that no physical examination was 
required prior to the effective date of the policy, and 
claims that the p~enalty waived was the lirubility to take 
a· physical examination and to "be free from all bodily 
ailments and disease·" at the date of the policy or its re-
instatement. See pages 2 and 3 of respondent's brief. 
True, no physical examination was required of insured, 
but in the alternative, a signed application was required 
of him, and upon the assumption that the staten1ents in 
the ,application were true, the policy was issued. That 
the signed application was required clearly negatives 
any showing of intent on the part of the defendant 
to waive of the requirement of sound health at the time 
of issuance of the policy. Even if it could be said that 
there was a waiver of the reinstatement requirements, 
this definite manifestation -of intent not to waive· the re-
quirement of good health at the time of issuance and de-
livery of the policy, which includes the waiver ride·r can-
not be overlooked. 
Certainly to regard the application as immaterial 
12 
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would be to disregard a basic stipulation of the parties, 
and the fact that such an application was required is 
inconsistent "ith the theory that there was a waiver of 
sound health, particularly at the time of issuance of the 
policy. It must be borne in n1ind that the application 
signed by the assured was as much a part of the contract 
as the waiYer provisions. The company w-ould not have 
issued the policy or signed the waiver but for the false 
and fra.udulent statenzents of assured. 
It does not follow that a "\vaiver of proof of insur-
ability at the time of reinstatement is a waiver of require-
ment of good health at the time of the issuance of the 
policy as the decision indicates. In the case of Planters 
Mutual Insurance Compa1~y vs. Lloyd, supra, the Court 
states the general rule in this regard. We quote from 
page 47 of Vol. 56 SW: 
"But if at the time of such negotiations the 
insurer is ignorant of the forfeiture, and of the 
misstatement which causes it, no waiver can be 
implied. Nor will an act which impliedly waives 
one ground of forefeiture affect . another for-
feiture of "\Vhich the company and its agent were · 
ignorant.'' 
It is respectfully urged that the Court erred in hold-
ing that the appellant had waived its rights relating to 
physical condition under the undisputed facts of this 
case. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE EFFECT OF 
BREACH OF WARRANTIES IN THE INSURANCE APPLI-
TION AS SUCH BREACH RELATES TO THE EXISTENCE 
13 
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OF THE POLICY AND THE WAIVER RIDER, WHICH WAS 
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SAME. 
In this case, at the time this waiver was executed, 
Appellant was relying, as it had a right to rely, upon the 
affirmative representations and warranties of the appli-
cation; and it had neither knowledge nor any facts which 
would cause it to believe that these representations were 
false. As a practical matter, it was not until the clain1 
was made and the investigation relative thereto under-
taken that what can only he de:scri!bed as the cupidity 
of the assured was ap·parent. Our concern lies with the 
fact that the court has completely ignored the effect of 
this breach of warranties, which beco1nes in reality the 
decisive issue in this case. 
The application, on its face, immediately above the 
signature of the applicant, affirmatively states as 
follows: 
"and that any concealments, Inisrepresentations 
or untrue staten1ents herein or if I am not alive 
and in good health at the time of the acceptance 
and delivery of the policy based hereon, or at the 
time of any reinstatement after a lapse thereof, 
hereby forfeit any benefits under any policy that 
n1ay be issued and hereby authorize the Secretary 
or President to cancel this policy." 
In net effect, this simply 1neans that the effective 
existence of the policy, and the included waiver, depended 
upon the truth of the representation of good health. It 
is our firm conviction that by virtue of such breach of 
warranty the company retained the right to cancel the 
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It is a basic and fundrunental rule that it is com-
petent for the parties to provide under what conditions 
and at \vhat time the policy should be effective. A sum-
mary of this rule as it relates to the requirment of sound 
health was stated by Justice Thurman in the case of 
White v. J.lletropolitan Life Insuran-ce Co., 63 Utah 272, 
22± Pac. 1106, at page 282 of 63 Utah Reports, as follows: 
UMany life insurance companies, as \Vill ap-
pear from a review of the cases cited, protect 
the1nselves by a clause in the application or policy 
to the effect that the insurance is not effective 
unless the insured is in good health when the 
policy should be delivered. As before stated these 
provisions are al \va.ys upheld by the courts." 
(Italics ours) 
In this case the parties agreed, as it was compet~nt 
for them to do, that the statements made 'hy assured con-
stituted warranties. One year prior to the application 
the assured had been hospitalized and treated for car-
diac failure and hypertension. The evidence is uncontra-
dicted that at the time of the application the assured was 
in ill health and that his ailments seriously enhanced the 
risk of death and were material to the risk. 
It has long been held in Utah that the very existence 
of an insurance contract of this nature depends upon the 
truth of the statements of warranties. The general rule 
is quoted by the Court in the case of Braddock by Smith 
vs. Pacific Woodmen Life Association, supra, at page 81 
of Vol. 89 Utah Reports : 
"A warranty in the law of insurance consists 
of a statement by insured upon the literal truth 
of which the validity of the contract depends." 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The assured, by violation of the terms of the appli-
cation, forfeited any rights he might have had under the 
policy, and his beneficiary is not entitled to any more 
rights in the contract than the assured 1night have had if 
he were still living. If assured's rights had been for-
feited, there would he no contract. Accordingly, there 
could be no waiver of terms of a contract which did not 
exist. The rule in this regard is well settled and was 
stated by this Court in the case of Jones vs. New York 
Life Insurarnce Company,.69 Utah 172,253 Pac. 200. We 
quote from page 179 of Vol. 69, Utah Reports: 
"The doctrine of waiver is hardly applicable 
to the facts here. The theory of the waiver of the 
terms of a contract. must necessarily presuppose 
the existence· of a valid contract. Unless and 
until a con tract exists between the contracting 
parties it would seem to be illogical to contend 
that either party can be said to have waived any 
of the terms or requirements of the contract." 
This proposition and the law of warranties is so 
well settled that further citation of authority is unneces-
sary. 
Appellant therefore asserts that by virtue of the 
breach of warranties contained in the application, the 
effective existence of both the poJicy and the included 
wa1ver was forfeited. Since the opinion of the Court 
has, in practical effect, overlooked this, not only as a 
matter of refe·rence in the op~inion but as a basis of de-




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully 
submits that the decision not only reaches an erroneous 
. . 
conclusion in the instant case, but if allowed to stand will 
create substantial confusion in Utah law relating to the 
effect of breach of warranty on insurance contracts, and 
will directly affect the continued validity of a long line of 
established Utah cases. 
Appellant most earnestly submits that the decision 
should be recalled and a hearing and reargument granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW, 
VERL C. RITC-HIE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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